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General psychological theories constitute the social caseworker's
most important conceptual tools. The caseworker's effectiveness in both
diagnosis and treatment will always be affected by the basic body of
theory to which he subscribes. It is, therefore, important that the
social caseworker, if he is to be effective in practice, think as clearly
and as consistently as possible in the area of theory.
It is this investigator's impression that the social work profes
sion is not as aware of its own theoretical assumptions as both thinking
and effective practice require. Schools of social work are often charac
terized as "psychoanalytically oriented," "behavioristically oriented,"
or sociologically oriented." In an earlier period schools of social work
were often divided in "Freudian" and "Rankian." More often actual case
work practice reflects an eclecticism which combines fragments from all
these theoretical orientations. There can be no objection to this per se.
Different frames of reference may illuminate different facets of man's
total human situation; but the history of all disciplines strongly sug
gests that if serious confusion is to be avoided eclecticism must ulti
mately give way to a more general and adequate theory which is both in
ternally consistent and coherent with the rest of human knowledge. It
seems to this investigator that the present state of social work theory
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often leaves the social work graduate in the precarious position of
having to diagnose and treat the human individual without a clear and
consistent view of what a human individual is. The most urgent present
need of all the helping professions is a defensible view of man in his
totality.
It is this investigator's opinion that social work education itself
is not fully aware of many of the intellectual currents which have al
ready begun to permeate and reshape social work theory. Much of what
is now standard casework theory, accepted by all trained social workers,
is neither psychoanalytical, behavioristic, nor sociological. Nor do the
categories of "Freudian" and "Rankian" have relevance. It is the author's
belief that presently the most far-reaching influence being exerted upon
casework theory and practice flows from the broad intellectual stream
known as "phenomenology" or "existentialism." Such basic and fundamen
tal social work concepts as the client's right of self-determination,
the importance of viewing the client subjectively or from the inside,
the current emphasis upon the client's powers of choice and his capaci
ty for assuming responsibility for his own life, even the concept of
"anxiety" as now used by most caseworkers, are neither Freudian nor be
havioristic in origin or meaning. In fact, none of these concepts, all
of which are essential to effective casework practice, could have pos
sibly had their origin in either behavioristic or psychoanalytically-
oriented psychologies. These are concepts which have been introduced
into the field of social work from the general movement of existential
ism. Whether these influences are desirable or otherwise -- and this
investigator believes they are entirely desirable — it is important
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that social work recognize what is happening to its own theoretical
foundations. Carl Rogers, for example, who continues to exert a tre
mendous influence upon both social casework and psychotherapy, makes
little use of a Freudian frame of reference. Rogers, who is an exis
tentialist or phenomenologist, is a severe and consistent critic of both
psychoanalytic and behavioristic psychologies. Yet many social casework
ers who continue to see themselves as "psychoanalytically oriented" also
pride themselves in being thoroughgoing Rogerians.2
What is required in the face of the present lack of clarity in
casework theory is a philosophical view of man which is both empirical
in the sense of being in touch with man's actual human situation and
also sufficiently general to pull together existing theory fragments
into a coherent and consistent whole. What is needed is a view of the
human individual in his totality. This may be a task which philosophy
and not psychology itself must perform.
In the following pages we have sought to present the basic philo
sophical thought of one outstanding modern existential thinker, Paul
Tillich. We believe a careful reading of Tillich's thought as set forth
in this thesis will demonstrate two facts of vital importance to all who
are actively engaged in social casework practice. First, existentialism
iFor a fuller statement of Rogers1 influence upon all counseling
professions see A. W. Combs, "Phenomenological Concepts in Non-directed
Therapy," Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, XLIV (August 1949),
29-39.
2For further discussion of the relationship between Freudian Psy
chology and Phenomenology see also Carl Rogers, "Person or Science?
A Philosophical Question," American Psychology. X (December 1955), 267-
278.
has vast and far-reaching theoretical and practical implications for the
social caseworker from the standpoint of personality, theory, diagnosis,
treatment techniques, and also from the standpoint of a defensible theory
of values. Tillich offers us the opportunity to pull together a multi
tude of disparate fragments into a dynamic whole. Secondly, in examining
Tillich's thought carefully the reader will become aware that through a
process of osmosis social casework in both theory and practice has already
become much more existentialist than it is either Freudian, Rankian, or
behavioristic; and while social casework would err seriously if it dis
carded Freud, it would be equally foolish for social casework to continue
to ignore the relevance and present influence of thinkers like Sartre,
Heidegger, Husserl, Kiekegaard, Buber, and Tillich. Our profession is
being profoundly influenced by these thinkers whether we choose to recog
nize this fact or not.
A brief word about the method used in preparing this study. One
cannot possibly understand existentialism or any one representative of
the existentialist movement without seeing his subject in the light of
the total context of Western culture. Existentialism is a broad move
ment which cuts across the whole of Western culture. In many ways it
is as hard to define as concepts like the "Renaissance," the "Age of
Reason," or the "Medieval Spirit." There are no easy or simple defi
nitions of "Existentialism." An examination of the bibliography will
suggest that the author's own preparatory reading ranges from the
general to the particular. Much of this reading, while valuable for
other reasons, proved to be irrelevant to the task at hand. In order
to give the thesis any focus at all it was necessary to choose one
existentialist thinker with the question in mind, "What does this thinker
have to say to social casework?" The conclusions drawn, while based upon
Tillich's thought, are my own.
CHAPTER II
THE HEIDEGGEBAN BACKGROUND OF TILLICH'S ANALYSIS
OP THE EXISTENTIAL CONDITION OF MAN
The appropriate point at which to begin an exposition of Tillich's
existentialism is certain core ideas which Tillich derives from the phil
osophy of Martin Heidegger who, along with Jean-Paul Sartre, is regarded
as the leader of Twentieth Century existentialist philosophy.1
Heidegger's philosophy begins with a question: At what point does
man's condition as man manifest itself most clearly and poignantly? As
the individual's awareness of his human condition grows and deepens,
what one constant, pervasive factor in his life threatens to render his
existence meaningless? The answer, in abstract terms, is the individ
ual's awareness of his finitude in an infinite universe. This, when
experienced at the deeper subjective level of one's personal existence,
means the dread of death and the fear of personal extinction. This fear,
anxiety, or dread, is heightened, multiplied, and rendered infinitely
more acute by the fact that man is the being who by definition is possess
ed of self-consciousness. Through his own thought, imagination, and pro
jection he can anticipate the endless time that stretches beyond death.
lAn excellent summary of the core ideas which Tillich derives
from Heidegger may be found in E. Weigert, "Existentialism and Its Re
lation to Psychiatry," Psychiatry. XII (September 1949), 399-412.
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He projects himself into an endless past in which he was not and also
envisages an endless future in which he will no longer be.
This anxiety, which is inherent in our self-conscious existence,
may not arise in its more acute forms in those who have an unquestioning
faith in an all-wise, benefolent Providence. But when traditional re
ligious forms begin to weaken, or disintegrate entirely, the individual
may suddenly be confronted with his true existential condition in all
its stark reality. No longer whielded from his true existential plight
by socially validated religious systems or institutionalized illusions
the individual, naked and alone, now faces the inescapable fact of his
own ultimate nonbeing.
Heidegger, true to the traditions of German speculative philosophy,
employs such metaphysical categories as "Being," "Nonbeing," "finitude,"
1
"ontological participation," etc.; but Heidegger insists that if these
traditional philosophical concepts are to have meaning, they must be
understood and experienced "existentially." For man there is but one
certainty: death. All growth in human self-awareness leads to a con
sciousness of this fact, which is universal, inescapable, and unalter
able for all finite human existence. For Heidegger the core of all
authentic selfhood consists in calmly recognizing this fact and becoming
at home with it. Only when the individual lives through this poignant
experience of self-discovery and accepts the fact that he can expect
For a discussion of Heidegger's existentialism as a possible
basis for a religious metaphysics see W. A. Kaufmann, Existentialism
From Dostoevskv To Sartre (New York: Meridian, 1956), pp. 201-221.
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nothing from the universe is he able to grasp the otherwise obscure
nature of "Being" and "Nonbeing." "Being" is not a metaphysical cate
gory by which we cognitively lay hold of the universe's objective
reality. "Being" is what we ourselves affirm in our struggle against
"Nonbeing." Only as we have the courage to see the human situation
as it really is do we begin to take "being," or reality, into our own
life and thus fulfill our vocation as man.
It follows for Heidegger that anything which prevents man from
recognizing and accepting his true existential condition thereby thwarts
his fullest self-actualization as man. If man is to come into his own,
all illusions and deceptions must be relentlessly stripped away. If
the individual is to pass from inauthentic to authentic selfhood he
must differentiate himself from the social mass whose function is to
blind the individual to his true condition. While these institutional
ized deceptions may allay the individual's existential anxiety, they
also keep him from achieving his fullest self-awareness as a self-
conscious being. If the individual is to be free, if he is to become
a genuine person, if he is to achieve his highest degree of self-actual
ization as man, he must learn to live in the light of the one existen
tial fact which is inherent in all human awareness, namely, the con
sciousness of the constant threat of death and nonbeing.
The fact that we know we are going to die does not, for Heidegger,
mean that we have faced the fact of death existentially. The surface
mind may accept death as an abstraction without experiencing it sub
jectively at its own deeper levels. This is particularly true of indi
viduals who remain tradition-oriented. Cultural systems and life-long
psychological conditioning may stifle the individual's full awareness
of his true existential condition. But for Heidegger, any failure to
make peace with death and nonbeing, any turning away from the pain of
one's ultimate personal extinction is always at the cost of human aware
ness. Man thereby falsefies himself and his universe; his self-actuali
zation as man is stifled and distorted; his growth and maturity as a
person is arrested; and his selfhood remains restricted, uncertain and
unreal.
In short, for Heidegger, man as man can never come into his own
unless he first faces the void of his own nothingness, looks unblink-
ingly at the abyss of his own ultimate nonbeing, and renounces all claims
upon the universe. It is against this general Heideggeran backgr ound
that we now turn to a more detailed consideration of the existentialism
of Paul Tillich.
CHAPTER III
TILLICH'S ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTENTIAL CONDITION OF MAN
For Tillich, as for Heidegger, anxiety lies at the core of all
conscious finite existence. It is inherent in self-consciousness be
cause it is intrinsic to man's existential condition, "Anxiety" as
the existentialists use the term is not synonymous with "anxiety" in
its psychoanalytical meaning. For Tillich "anxiety" is existential
anxiety. As Freud uses the term, "anxiety" is "neurotic anxiety" or
"pathological anxiety." But for Tillich, as we shall see in a later
section, all anxiety -- normal, pathological, and neurotic -- are states
of existential anxiety existing under special conditions. This is an
important distinction and its implications will be fully developed later.
For the present we turn to a consideration of the nature of existential
anxiety and the several forms which it may take.
1. The Anxiety of Fate And Death. Tillich's anxiety of fate and
death is essentially the same as Heidegger's dread of death, but for
Tillich the dread of death contains the element of fate as well as death.
By "fate" Tillich means forces in the individual's life which are con
tingent and unpredictable. The individual has no control over them; and
as far as he is humanly able to ascertain, they are meaningless, sense
less, and unnecessary. Yet the individual is, everywhere and at every
moment of his existence, completely at fate's mercy. Fate, which is
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always the relative threat, generates a basic, pervasive, and ineradi
cable anxiety because in the background of fate always stands the abso
lute threat, namely, death. Because the individual is always at the
mercy of fate, and because death is always potentially present in fate,
the fear of death becomes not only a factor in the last moment of one's
personal existence, it is also a decisive factor of consciousness in
every moment of man's being within existence. The threat of death ex
isted for all men at all times. Hence the anxiety of fate and death is
present in every moment of self-conscious existence even when an immedi
ate threat of death is absent.1
2. The Anxiety of Emptiness and Meaninglessness. We have now to
consider what is implied in man's existence as a human person; and, given
this definition of the human person, what kinds of things constitute a
threat to its existence. Self-actualization of a person cannot be con
ceived after the analogy of the spontaneous unfolding of other organic
forms. The self-affirmation of one's personal being is not like the un
folding of a flower, nor is it like the growth of one's body. Because
man is a self-conscious being, self-affirmation is always in terms of
meanings. Man is creatively human only to the extent that he understands
and shapes reality. For man self-actualization is not the blind activism
which releases purposeless vitality. Man has goals, values, purposes.
Man is a being who does what he does for reasons which may or may not be
"valid" or "true" but which must always be reasonably acceptable to him.
Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven & London: Yale Uni
versity Press, 1952), pp. 42-45.
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He is continuously in process of evaluating and judging what he has done
by values which he has chosen. He requires, precisely because he is
human, an answer to the meaning of his existence. The absence of mean
ings, and a personal commitment to these meanings, is a threat to the
whole being of the person as a person. Tillich says that the individual,
if self-affirmation is to be possible, must have ultimate concerns. By
"ultimate concerns" Tillich means generalized meanings which give mean
ing to all meaning.
When the individual lacks value commitments, there is nothing to
elicit from him a creative response at its deeper levels, and his very
being as a person is threatened at its center in one of two ways: namely,
by the anxiety of emptiness, which is the relative threat, or by meaning
lessness, which is the absolute threat. In either case the individual
experiences existential anxiety because in terms of all that makes him
human his existence is threatened. As a person he experiences himself
as impoverished, diminished, thwarted. This for Tillich is the psycho
logical counterpart of Heidegger's dread of death and nothingness.
The existential anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness reflect
a basic paradox which is inherent in the human situation. Doubt is an
essential element in all higher forms of man's self-affirmation: science,
government, social reform, change and progress, the creative arts, etc.
Doubt is an absolutely necessary ingredient in each stage of the indi
vidual's expanding, growing self-awareness. It is the essence of his
being as man. But when doubt becomes total, it becomes a threat to man's
self-affirmation. For Tillich, emptiness and meaninglessness are the
characteristic forms of existential anxiety in our age. Relative freedom
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from it is possible only in stable and static cultures.1
3. The Anxiety of Guilt and Condemnation. But man, says Tillich,
is threatened from a third side. Man's being, whose nature is to actual
ize itself, is not only given him but also demanded of him. Whether he
finds viable meanings through which he can affirm his life or not, he is
nevertheless responsible for his life. He is required to answer, if he
is asked, what he has made of himself. He who asks him is his judge,
namely, he himself, who at the same time stands over against him. This
too, says Tillich, is inherent in the existential situation. I am re
sponsible for what I make, or fail to make, of myself; and I am respon
sible to myself.
For Tillich man is "finite freedom." This is not the freedom of
indeterminancy but the freedom to determine oneself through decisions
at the center of one's being. This freedom, says Tillich, is always
within the contingencies of finitude. Within these limits man is asked
to make of himself what he is supposed to become, namely, a human being
whose potentialities as a human being are fully actualized. Man is
always under his own categorical imperative to fulfill his destiny as
man. In every act of moral choice he contributes to the actualization
of what he potentially is.
This produces an existential anxiety which in relative terms is
the existential anxiety of guilt and in its absolute terms is the exis
tential anxiety of self-rejection and condemnation. Man cannot accept
LIbid., pp. 46-51.
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his being passively. He is always under the moral imperative of doing
something with it, and this in turn always requires values and meanings.
By way of summary Tillich has said there are three ways of viewing
existential anxiety. Existential anxiety may manifest itself in the form
of fate and death, emptiness and meaninglessness, guilt and condemnation.
These three forms of experiencing one's existential condition are always
interrelated in the individual's concrete human situation. Says Tillich:
The anxiety of the one type is immanent in the anxiety
of the other types ... the threat of fate and death
has always awakened and increased the consciousness of
guilt. The threat of moral nonbeing was experienced
in and through the threat of ontic nonbeing. The con
tingencies of fate received moral interpretation. Fate
executes the negative moral judgment by attacking and
perhaps destroying the ontic foundations of the morally
rejected personality. The two forms of anxiety provoke
and augment each other. In the same way spiritual and
moral nonbeing are interdependent. Obedience to the
moral norm, i.e., to one's own essential being excludes
emptiness and meaninglessness in their radical forms...
while the disintegration of the moral conscience is an
almost inevitable basis for the attack of spiritual
nonbeing. On the other hand, existential doubt can
undermine moral self-affirmation by throwing into the
abyss of skepticism not only every moral principle
but the meaning of moral self-affirmation as such. In
this case the doubt is felt as guilt while at the same
time guilt is undermined by doubt.*
The three types of anxiety are interwoven because their underlying
unity is existential. They are inherent in the human situation. They
cannot be argued away, nor c an they be removed by psychiatry, psycho
therapy, or social casework. They can only be accepted through what




The Condition of Existential Despair
The above analysis has brought us to a point which can be summar
ized as follows: awareness of one's true existential condition produces
existential anxiety, and existential anxiety finds its fulfillment in
despair. Despair is implicit in the human situation. It is, in fact,
the only appropriate human response to the human situation. We have now
to ask, what is despair and what does it imply for the human enterprise?
The meaning of despair, says Tillich, is "without hope." When one
has reached the condition of despair, no way out into the future opens
to him. In despair there is no way out. In despair, says Tillich, we
experience nonbeing and meaninglessness, absurdity and senselessness,
as absolutely victorious in our lives. At this point the self which
is aware of its despair wants to blot out the self which is aware. The
self wants to get rid of the self but cannot. Why? Because if anxiety
were only the anxiety of fate and death, voluntary death, or suicide,
would be the way out of despair. But despair is also the despair of
guilt and condemnation. Man, even in his despair, is still the being
who is required to answer, if he is asked, what he has made of himself;
and he who asks him, namely, himself, is still his judge. Suicide can
liberate from the anxiety of fate and death, but it cannot liberate from
the anxiety of guilt and condemnation. Man's ultimate absurdity is that
the senselessness of his existence renders impossible even an appropri
ate response to his condition of despair. He cannot take the step which
would eliminate the self which experiences the anguish of despair. The
greater becomes the desire to do away with the self the greater still
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becomes the self's awareness of the futility of the solution. This, says
Tillien, is what makes despair so desperately desperate. There is, in
Sartre's words, "No Exit."1
This brings us to a crucial point in Tillich's analysis. If despair
is the point to which all developing finite awareness ultimately leads,
and if this point is marked "No Exit," precisely what recourse is there?
Tillich says that fortunately despair is a "boundary line." We cannot
go beyond it. When we have faced it there is nothing more to face. Since
we cannot go beyond despair is there anything which can be done with de
spair? Tillich says that if there is an answer to the problem of exis
tential despair it must be found within the existential situation itself
and not outside it. A religious leap of faith to a point outside the
existential situation will not do.2 Existential despair must yield its
own answer. The problem of doubt and meaninglessness must be resolved
existentially or it cannot be resolved at all. Only this kind of answer
will meet the needs of modern man.
For Tillich there is only one possible answer: every radical ne
gation contains an implicit affirmation. The act of accepting meaning
lessness is itself a profoundly meaningful act. The experience of despair
implies heightened human sensibilities, an expanded and deepened human
awareness. The facing and acceptance of this despair involves a degree
of intelligence, courage, and integrity which are themselves the very
1Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays (New York: Vin
tage, 1955).
2The current American theological interest in the implications of
this position may be traced in Thomas J. Altizer and William Hamilton,
Radical Theology and The Death of God (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Co,
1966).
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highest forms of self-affirmation. In the experience of despair the
individual is already sensitized too, and has taken into himself, vast
ranges of truth and reality. This is what Tillich means by the "Courage
of despair" or "The courage To Be" in the face of despair.1 It is, para
doxically, through despair that man achieves his destiny as man. Through
the anxiety of death and meaninglessness the inauthentic self gains authen
ticity, and meaninglessness becomes meaningful. It is not a question of
whether life has meaning. This is life's meaning! It is the meaning which
the authentic person requires, namely, that I shall be able to accept the
gift of life and affirm it.
Self-Affirmation and the God Above God
For Tillich the individual's self-affirmation in the face of life's
apparent meaninglessness is itself an act of faith. But it is important
to understand what Tillich means by this. For Tillich "absolute faith,"
which enables the individual to choose self-affirmation as the only alter
native to despair, is without rational content. It is not a cognitive
act which embraces rational or creedal propositions about anything. The
self simply stands upon the brink of an ultimate despair and decides that
it is better to "be" than "not to be." It is as though the self said,
"Anything is better than despair. I will accept and affirm myself, with
or without a rationale for so doing." When this is done the self achieves
a degree of reality and meaningfulness which validates the act of abso
lute faith.
tillich, op. cit.. pp. 140-142.
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For Tillich the fact that we can do this, and the fact that not
withstanding the meaninglessness of existence most people do manage to
do it, implies certain presuppositions about "Being," or the Universe,
itself. The individual can affirm his being in spite of his being totally
unable to find defensible reasons for doing so only because the individ
ual participates in universal being whose nature is itself an eternal
process of becoming. In the final analysis, man's self-affirmation is
possible only because of a source of self-actualization outside himself.
The individual, whether he is aware of it or not, is a part of the crea
tivity which is the cosmic process itself.
Tillich is careful to state, however, that from the standpoint of
the individual the existential situation is not affected one way or the
other by its implied ontology. Through "absolute faith" the individual
can affirm his being whether he believes this self-affirmation is sus
tained by an outside source or not. Says Tillich:
Man may not necessarily be aware of this source.
In situations of cynicism and indifference he is not
aware of it. But it works in him as long as he main
tains the courage to take his anxiety upon himself.
In the act of the courage to be, the power of being is
effective in us, whether we recognize it or not. Every
act of courage is a manifestation of the ground of being,
however questionable the content of the act may be. The
content may hide or distort true being, the courage in
it reveals true being. Not arguments but the courage to
be reveals the true nature of being-itself. By affirming
our being we participate in the self-affirmation of being
itself. There are no valid arguments for the existence
of God, but there are acts of courage in which we affirm
the power of being, whether we know it or not.2
iFor a full statement of Tillich's views on Christian Theology
the reader is referred to Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 3 Vols.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-63).
2Tillich, The Courage To Be. p. 181.
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We have seen that for Tillich absolute faith is without special
rational content, but this does not mean that it is without any content
whatever. The content of absolute faith, for Tillich, is the "God Who
Is Above God." All arguments for the existence of God fail to convince
because the God whose existence the arguments would prove is meaningless.
For Tillich "God" is a "limit notion." All that can be said about God
is that he is the "Ground of Being." This is nothing more nor less than
the boundless sea of mystery which surrounds and sustains all known and
knowable reality. It is the reservoir of all unactualized possibility.
It is not an entity existing among other entities. Like the Mystic's
"Absolute" we stand before it in mute silence. The "Ground of Being,"
or the "God Above God," is the ultimate mystery of all existence, and it
is beyond all human knowing. Yet to the degree that an individual finds
the courage to affirm his being as man, God, or the Ground of Being, is
as real in the life of the irreligious scientist as in the creative love
of the religious saint. Both scientist and saint, atheist and mystic,
are participants in the universal process of creativity whose ultimate
source is the "Ground of Being" or the "God Above God."
It is against this background that we gain added insight into what
Tillich means by "Absolute Faith." As the Ground of Being is not a de
finable entity among other entities, so absolute faith is not a state
of mind existing among other states of mind. Absolute faith is never
something separate and definite, nor is it a state which can be isolated
and described. Tillich says it is always a movement in, with, and under
other states of mind. This faith is without a name, a church, a cult,
or a theology; but it moves in the depths of all of them. It is the
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power of being in which these things participate and of which they are
fragmentary expressions. One does not come into this dimension of faith
though catechizing or theologizing or through rationally articulated doc
trines or creeds. One comes to it through existential anxiety. In the
face of life's emptiness and meaninglessness, when traditional symbols
have lost their power, absolute faith awakens in one the courage to af
firm his being even when all the inherited concepts of "God," "Immortali
ty" and "Providence" are no longer believable. Even in the face of total
doubt absolute faith gives us the courage to say "yes" to being.
For Tillich this is as far as faith can go, and it is as far as it
needs to go. Says Tillich:
The courage to take the anxiety of meaninglessness
upon oneself is the boundary line up to which the
courage to be can go. Beyond it is mere nonbeing.
Within it all forms of courage are reestablished in
the power of God who is above the God of theism.
The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears




IMPLICATION FOR SOCIAL CASEWORK THEORY AND PRACTICE
We have before us Tillich's analysis of man's existential condi
tion. We must ask, what does this analysis imply for social casework
theory and practice? Our thesis is that Tillich's philosophical posi
tion has implications for the following areas of social casework:
(1) psychological theory, (2) diagnosis, (3) treatment, which three
implications require and make possible, and (4) general value theory.
We will now develop each implication in turn.
Implications For Personality Theory
Tillich's criticism of existing psychological theories can best
be understood against the background of his philosophical phenomenolo
gy.1 For Tillich, as for all phenomenologists, the one basic certainty
is the self's subjectivity. It is with this certainty that all know
ledge must begin. To fail to understand this is to fail to understand
either existentialism or the doubt and meaninglessness of our age. For
the existentialist all "objective" and "scientific" certainties crumble
before the self's powers of critical analysis. The nuclear physicist
holds, for example, that "real" and "hard" things like molecular
a concise explanation of the concept of "Phenomenology" and
the relation of Phenomenology to the general existential movement see




structures, once presumed to be fundamental "stuff" out of which the
material world itself was made, are simply convenient constructs of the
mind with no more objective reality than mathematical symbols. For criti
cal epistomology the self can never leap the chasm which separates sub
ject from object. What "reality" is in terms of Kant's Ding-in-sich
is both unknown and unknowable. When doubt becomes total, as it has for
the modern mind, the only certainty which cannot be questioned without
contradiction is the existence of the self which doubts. For Tillich,
as for Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, this is the meaning of Descartes'
Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore, I am), although for Tillich there
is much more to sum than cogito. Any recovery of certainty, or any re
construction of meaning, therefore, must begin at this point, namely,
with a subjective self which looks out upon a world whose ultimate nature
it cannot know. This is what all existentialists mean by the primacy and
transcendence of the self.
We now ask, what for Tillich is the nature of this subjective self
whose subjectivity constitutes man's only certainty in an age of doubt
and meaninglessness? The distinguishing characteristic of man is his
self-consciousness. This reality, which is all the self can know with
immediate certainty, cannot be explained in terms of anything less than
itself. It is like nothing else the self can imagine or conjecture. In
self-consciousness the self experiences itself as both subject and ob
ject, judge and judged. It sees itself both as it is and as it might be.
It is limited by time and space, and yet it is limited by neither. In
the fact of self-consciousness, says Tillich, nature has taken a "leap,"
and ordinary scientific methods cannot cope with what this leap has
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brought into being.
For Tillich all scientific, objective psychologies violate the
human person as we know him. Scientific psychologies, in order to be
"objective," must view persons as objects. This not only violates the
"object" which it purports to understand. It assumes that we know what
"objects" are when in actuality all we know is subjects. It explains
the known in terms of the unknown. The human person in his innermost
nature is a unique, subjective being. Any meticulous measuring of his
universal, objective qualities, therefore, tells us little about the
man himself. The man who is known to objective psychology is always
a distorted, truncated man.2 For Tillich, as for all existentialists,
objective behavioristic psychology represents the ultimate perversion of
the human individual and the ultimate depersonalization and dehumaniza-
tion of man.
For Tillich a defensible theory of personality must include both
the self's centeredness and its existential wholeness. Tillich finds
psychoanalytically oriented theories more feasible than scientific be
havioristic theories, but he insists that the basic insights of the
psychoanalytical movement add up to a consistent and coherent theory of
personality only if these insights are viewed in a broader existential
context. To describe a person as an ego-id-superego system, with each
part battling for domination of the individual's personal center, violates
Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," Journal of The History of
Ideas V (December 1944), 44-70.
2For a critical appraisal of the underlying and often unquestioned
presuppositions of science itself see Reinhold Niebuhr, "Limitations of
the Scientific Method: and Answer to Pierr Auger," Bulletin of Atomic
Science. XI (Fall 1955), 87.
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both the centeredness and the wholeness essential to a defensible con
cept of a person. A person, even in a relatively advanced stage of
pathological disintegration, is more than a sorted collection of pieces.
The id, ego, and superego are not desparate parts of the self. The self
experiences each as profoundly its own. Psychoanalytical concepts like
"repression," "projection," "rationalization," etc., become intelligible
only when viewed as expressions of a centered self. Repression, for
example, is not an automatic mechanism which operates apart from me.
I repress materials in my conscious mind because I want them repressed;
and, at a deeper level of consciousness, I know I want them repressed;
and, at a still deeper level, I actually experience myself as the agent
which represses them.
But for Tillich this points up a still more decisive question:
why, and under what circumstances, do I feel compelled to repress vital
areas of my life and being? Repressed desires, urges, and wishes, says
Tillich, are the self's unactualized potentialities. Tillich asks, why
do we seek through repression to blot out dimensions of our personal
being? Because we cannot face the existential situation and the anxiety
inherent in that situation. All neurosis, as we shall see, is the self's
maneuver to affirm its reality on a limited scale through the diminish
ing of the self. The self, unable or unwilling to tolerate the anxiery
of its existential condition blocks off important sectors of the self
in order to affirm what is left of the self.
By way of summary, Tillich finds current personality theories
acceptable only when reinterpreted in the light of man's total existen
tial condition. For him the self must be recognized as both centered
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and whole. Man is a unique and subjective being for whom freedom,
choice, decision, and responsibility are real. He can be understood
only when he is approached and accepted in his existential wholeness
because in the reality which is the "person" the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts. Because in his essence man is subject and not
object we gain insight into him only when we relate to him as a subjec
tive being. For Tillich the contributions of the psychoanalytical move
ment are rich and vast, but to the extent that psychoanalytical theories
are abstractions from the wholeness of living persons they, like the
behavioristic theories, contribute to the dehumanization of man.
Implications for Casework Diagnosis
Tillien's refocusing of accepted personality theories inevitably
involves a corresponding reappraisal of accepted approaches in the area
of diagnosis and treatment. Freud held, for example, that anxiety is
the core of all psychopathology; but unfortunately, said Freud, no satis
factory theory of anxiety exists. Earlier Freud had said that anxiety
is the reemergence of repressed libido. Later he held to that anxiety
is not the effect of repression but its cause. For Freud this lack of
a consistent theory of anxiety, which affects both diagnosis and treat
ment, was a major failing of the psychoanalytical movement.
For Tillich this confusion in the area of basic psychological
theory stems from a failure to see the human person as a centered self
1Rollo May, Existential Psychology (New York: Random House, 1961),
pp. 19-25.
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possessed of existential wholeness. All existing theories have one
thing in common: anxiety is seen as the awareness of unresolved con
flict between the structural elements of personality. These conflicts
may be between unconscious drives and repressed norms, between different
drives struggling for the domination of the personality's center, between
an urge toward greatness and the individual's experience of smallness
and insignificance, between the need to be accepted and the fear that
one is not accepted, etc., but for all these theories anxiety is the
result of a conflict between the personality's structural parts.
But for Tillich this ignores the most basic, most universal, and
most inescapable of all human experiences, namely, the individual's
existential condition. The human individual does not become anxious
because of a lack of harmony in the functioning of his internal parts.
Unless something much more important is at stake why should the indi
vidual's internal harmony matter? An individual becomes anxious because
the whole of his being as a person is threatened. Inner conflicts be
come relevant only when they threaten the centeredness and existential
wholeness of the person. What is always at stake is the self in its
existential totality.
What Tillich means by this can be illustrated by Freud's classi
cal story of Little Hans. What we have is a child's phobia involving
the following elements: a child, parents, horses, penises, infantile
2
sexuality, an unresolved oedipal, and various defense mechanisms. But
1Ibid., pp. 75-85.
2Ruth L. Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955), pp. 164-165.
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we cannot say that Han's phobia, or the anxiety which precipitated the
phobia, is caused by any of these factors or by any combination of them.
None of these factors would be intelligible unless a more basic condi
tion existed first, namely, a self which experiences itself as threatened
in the whole of its being. Unresolved Oedipals, repressed sexuality,
penis symbols, castration fears, etc., are meaningful only insofar as
they are parts of a larger dynamic whole in which a human person is
threatened in his totality. Only as we see Han's phobic reaction as a path
ological adjustment to what has become for him an existential crisis does
the complex and involved psychoanalytical terminology used to describe
his case have meaning. Only on this basis can a causal sequence of
events be established. This is what Tillich means when he says that all
neurotic anxiety is a state of existential anxiety under special condi
tions .
This brings us to a consideration of the difference between exis
tential and neurotic anxiety. We have seen that implicit in man's
existential condition is an ultimate despair. The only alternative to
despair is self-affirmation. But, says Tillich, there is one other
alternative. The individual who can neither accept despair nor affirm
his being in the face of this despair may avoid both by escaping into
neurosis. The neurotic avoids despair by affirming himself on a limited
scale. Self-affirmation is not lacking, says Tillich, but the self which
is affirmed is a reduced one. The neurotic affirms that which is less
than his essential or potential being. He blocks off through repression
significant sectors of himself in order to actualize what is left.
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Of the neurosis itself, Tillich says:
This is, so as to speak, the castle to which he has
retired and which he defends with all the means of
psychological resistance against attack, be it from
the side of reality or from the side of the analyst.
And this resistance is not without some instinctive
wisdom.... The danger is either that he will fall
back into another and much better defended neurosis
or that with the breakdown of his limited self-affirma
tion he will fall into unlimited despair.
The neurotic adjustment pits the neurotic against reality and
reality against the neurotic. The ensuing conflict generates its own
special kind of anxiety in addition to the individual's existential
anxiety, namely the neurotic anxiety of having to maintain the neurotic
defense system against reality. But both the neurotic defenses and the
resulting neurotic anxiety are brought into play by a more basic anxiety,
namely, existential anxiety.
For Tillich the distinction between neurotic and existential anxi
ety not only brings needed clarity to psychological theory; it also
makes available a practical and useful diagnostic tool* At the core of
all psychopathology there is one common, unvarying factor, namely, an
existentially threatened self. It does not matter how complex, multiple,
or bizaar the symptoms, as long as the personality distortion is function
al and not organic in origin, the underlying causal factor is always one
and the same, namely, a person whose existence as a person is threatened.
It would seem that if the above theory of anxiety is valie, the
principle involved would be as diagnostically applicable to one type of
emotional distortion as another regardless of place, time, or social
1Tillich. The Courage To Be, p, 68
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milieu. We believe this to be the case. Erick Fromm's "market-oriented"
people, Rollo May's "Hollow Men," and David Reissman's "other-directed"
personalities, for example, are not "neurotics" or "hysterics" in the
Freudian sense. Nor are they socially "maladjusted" people. These are
the Twentieth Century's "Empty People" for whom doubt, meaninglessness,
and existential despair takes the form of actually experiencing them
selves as non-persons. Their effort to actualize themselves through
"other-directedness" involves a loss of autonomy essential to their
self-affirmation as persons. Their flight into the "Lonely Crowd" is
as much an expression of existential despair as Freud's classical neu
rotics .
The significance of this analysis in the diagnosis of any and all
emotional pathologies would seem to be clear. Since for Tillich, all
anxiety is basically existential anxiety, and since existential anxiety
is basic, universal, and inescapable, the pertinent diagnostic question
in any and all emotional distortions would seem to be, "At what point,
and in what ways, is this particular individual's existence as a human
being, being threatened?"
Implications For Casework Treatment
For Tillich the goals of all treatment, whether in psychotherapy,
social casework, or pastoral counseling, is to help the individual avoid
neurotic or pathological adjustments to existential anxiety and achieve
fuller self-actualization through the acceptance of his existential
condition.
As a philosophical generalization this is true, but the actual
treatment of the neurotically disturbed cannot be this simple. We have
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said that it is only through meanings, or values, that the individual
is able to achieve and maintain normal human functioning. The obverse
of this is also true; it is only through meanings and values that the
neurotically ill can be restored to normal functioning. Emotional ill
ness always involves both emotional conflict and a basic confusion in
the individual's values, meanings, and life purposes. The patient's
neurotic illness is usually equated with his inner emotional conflicts,
but this is only because it is his inner conflicts, and not his confu
sion of values and life purposes, which the individual experiences with
pain and immediacy. The absence of values, meanings, and life purposes,
which creates both the emotional conflicts and the individual's illness,
may never become apparent to either the individual or the therapist who
works with him. But this does not mean that values and meanings are
not crucial. Basic to all emotional pathology is the problem of values
and meanings.
The effective treatment of the neurotically disturbed, says Tillich,
will always involve two interdependent, interacting factors. There is
first the problem of resolving, through specialized psychotherapeutic
techniques, the patient's already-formed neurosis. The patient must
be led to see that his pathological adjustment prevents his self-actuali
zation and that through the neurotic anxiety which the pathological ad
justment creates he is not escaping from but adding to the anxiety in
herent in his life situation. This, Tillich says, cannot be done by
philosophy. It can only be done by qualified persons trained in the
psychological skills. But once the patient has worked through his
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neurosis there will remain for him the problem of meaningfulness.
It was precisely the absence of meaning in the patient's life which
led him into his neurotic adjustment. Unless he can be helped to find
viable meanings and values through which he can affirm himself, says
Tillich, he will almost certainly fall back into another and better de
fended neurosis; or with the breakdown of his limited self-affirmation
he will fall into a limitless despair.
This brings Tillich's analysis to its most crucial point. Where,
in an age of doubt and meaninglessness, are these needed values to be
found? On what foundation, in an age of relativities, is a standard
of value to be erected? For the generation which has witnessed the
"Death of God," and in a Universe which couldn't care less, what ulti
mate criterion of value is possible? For modern man value norms cannot
be handed down from on high. This is precisely the underlying source
of modern man's problem. For modern man there is no "On High." All he
knows, or ever will know, is his present existential condition.
Implications for A Theory of Value
Because for Tillich values and meanings are absolutely decisive
for man's self-actualization we must now ask, What does Tillich mean
by "values" and what does he mean by "meanings?"
We have seen that for Heidegger the purpose of all culture is to
conceal from man his true existential condition and that man never comes
'•For a sharper distinction between the respective roles of the
philosopher and the psychotherapist in the treatment of the mentally
ill see Paul Tillich, "Anxiety, Religion, and Medicine." Pastoral Psy-
chology, III (April, 1952), 11-17.
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into his own until he relentlessly strips away all illusions and looks
at his human situation for what it really is. Tillich agrees that the
function of all culture is to make possible man's self-affirmation in
the face of his existential despair, but he insists that we must be very
clear about what this implies. For Tillich all values and meanings are
mediated to the individual through "systems of meaning." It is only
through these "systems of meaning" that man's existential condition
becomes tolerable. The anxiety of fate and death, for example, produces
in the individual what might be called a normal, or non-pathological,
striving for security. The individual knows that there is no absolute
and final security. He may also know that life often demands the cour
age to sacrifice some or even all security for the sake of a fuller
self-affirmation. But most human energies, individual and collective,
are focused upon one overriding human concern, namely, to reduce, avoid,
deny, or delay the power of fate and death. Ultimately man does not
succeed in this undertaking; but by resisting fate and death, by strug
gling against it collectively and individually, postponing it, and
building institutionalized defenses against it, man manages to actual
ize his being as man. He not only creates and sustains societies,
cultures and civilizations, but as an individual he becomes a socialized
being and thereby actualizes his highest human potentialities as an
individual. Similarly, as man grows in total awareness, he finds it
increasingly difficult to discover rational grounds for believing his
existence has any meaning. This basic fear of an ultimate meaningless-
ness in his life is made tolerable to him only through finite systems
of meaning which he himself creates: religions, science, philosophy,
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art forms, ideologies, etc. Only this creative response to his exis
tential plight makes possible man's affirmation of meaning in the face
of an ultimate cosmic meaninglessness.
But what we are dealing with in "systems of meaning," says Tillich,
is the individual's relationship to socially inherited culture forms.
The individual escapes an ultimate despair only by being born into a
relatively stable culture which offers him meanings and values already
established and validated by the authority of tradition. But what, asks
Tillich, happens when all systems of meaning, and the societies which
sustain them, are themselves threatened with meaninglessness? The answer
is the universal breakdown in meaning. The individual then stands, alone
and defenseless, against naked despair. For Tillich this is precisely
what has happened to large segments of mankind in an age of rapid social
change. Modern man no longer finds traditional institutionalized re
sponses to existential despair credible. Values and meanings which
in more stable periods of history saved him from an ultimate despair
and made possible his self-affirmation are no longer possible for him.
For Tillich there is only one possible answer to the crucial
question of value: the values and meanings which we seek must be found
in the structure of man himself. For Tillich structure is inherent in
all being: personality, or the human self, is no exception. Man's self-
actualization, like the self-actualization of anything else in a dynamic,
evolving universe, takes place in and through structures. The fact that
we are persons, and not something else, implies structural limitations
inherent in personality itself.
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Of man's basic nature Tillich says,
He is given to himself as what he is. He has received
his being and with it the structure of his being, in
cluding the structure of finite freedom. Man can affirm
himself only if he affirms not an empty shell, a mere
possibility, but the structure of being in which he finds
himself.... Finite freedom has a definite structure, and
if the self tries to trespass on this structure it ends in
the loss of itself.... This is true of the cynic. He can
not escape the forces of his self which may drive him into
a complete loss of the freedom that he wants to preserve.*
For Tillich the philosophical doctrine of the "relativity of
values" is valid only within the limits imposed by the structure inherent
in man. Thd individual's self-actualization, regardless of his cultural
orientation, always occurs within the context of an existential condi
tion common to all men everywhere. All value systems, all systems of
meaning, all culture forms, all societies, reflect at least one universal
element: their purpose is to make possible, under whatever conditions
may exist in a particular time and place, the self-actualization of the
human beings who are involved. From the standpoint of any given cul
tural frame of reference, some value systems will always seem to us
more true and others less true; but their basic purpose is identical,
namely, the actualization of human potentialities. The ultimate and
universal value implicit in all cultures is the self-actualization of
persons, not the changing, shifting, and often conflicting social forms
through which this takes place. Cultures and value systems are always
relative; but we have to ask, relative to what? The answer is, relative
to the development of the human beings involved. For Tillich this is
lPaul Tillich, "Being and Love," Pastoral Psychology. XLIII(De-
cember, 1954), 46.
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the "meaning which gives meaning to all meaning." The self-actualiza
tion of man's own inherent human potentials is a universal moral im
perative which man imposes upon himself precisely because he is man.
The cultural anthropolotist who insists that all values are rela
tive does so with reservations. What he means is, "Do not interfere
with the sexual taboos and religious beliefs of these primitive people.
It is only through these taboos and beliefs that they achieve self-
affirmation as human beings." The implied absolute to which the anthro
pologist appeals is that every human being, because he is a human being,
has the right of self-actualization through whatever meanings and value
systems may be possible for him. Similarly, many Western value judge
ments may be false and destructive; but value judgements like "the value
of the individual," "the inherent worth of persons," "the dignity of man,"
etc., cannot be equated with any particular culture or with any particu
lar society because they define the universal conditions for the self-
actualization of man as man.
iFor Sartre "Existence precedes essence," or "Until we affirm our
existence we have no essence." For Tillich this is unacceptable. Man's
essence, for Tillich, is his own inherent structure as man. See Mary
Warnoch, The Philosophy of Sartre (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965),
pp. 110-134.
2The view that the validity of certain basic value judgements have
to be assumed, with or without rational justification, if the social
worker's existence is to be justified, and if he is to function at all,
is interestingly presented by Henry Miller, "Value Dilemmas in Social
Casework." Social Work Journal. XIII (January, 1968), 27.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This brings us to a final question: granted that the universal
goal of all finite existence is self-actualization, what precisely does
this mean for the social worker who, like his client, is caught in the
doubt, emptiness, and meaninglessness of his age? What does this uni
versal goal, or value, mean in terms of its application to concrete
problems confronting the social worker? For the social worker, and for
social work philosophy, Tillich's philosophy of value would seem to have
the following implications:
1. It is an interpretation of value which saves the social worker
himself from the ultimate meaninglessness which characterizes our soci
ety and which so often afflicts the client with whom the worker is
called upon to work. A thoroughgoing ethical relativism will always
leave the social worker without clearly defined professional goals.
For Tillich this is unacceptable. If the helping professions are not
to contribute to the meaninglessness and despair of our age there must
be for both worker and client goals which are clear and positive. For
Tillich this is possible without the sacrifice of the worker's intel
lectual honesty. The professional worker's goal, under any and all
circumstances, is the client's fullest possible self-actualization as
a human being* This goal is neither relative nor arbitrary. It is, as
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we have seen, rooted in the structure of man as man. This does not
offer the worker a detailed guideline as to what he should do in any
particular case, but it does define the general direction in which
both worker and client must move.
2. Tillich's interpretation of values makes possible and neces
sary a broader focus in the one-to-one relationship. The casework rela
tionship must always include the worker's awareness of both the client's
psychological processes and the client's functioning value system and
the bearing which each of these factors has upon the other. Relevant
to this broader focus are such questions as the following: Where does
the client currently stand in his relationship to the value norms of
his culture? Are his inherited systems of meaning, as for example, his
basic religious beliefs, sufficiently intact to make his self-affirma
tion possible? Or must the worker explore with the client the possi
bility of new values and new meanings? If so, what new value orienta
tions are acceptable to the client? Given the client's total life
situation, what life purposes are for him believable? If the client's
basic attitude toward life is one of existential despair, is the worker
himself sufficiently mature and aware as a person to convey to the client
what Tillich calls the "Courage of despair?" Increasingly the case
worker may find it necessary, if he is to meet the deepest needs in
his client, to assume in addition to his traditional role of caseworker
also the role of a philosopher of values and even that of interpreter
of life's ultimate meanings.
3. Tillich's philosophy of value also defines the social worker's
responsibility to the whole of the client's social and cultural milieu.
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If self-actualization of the individual is possible only through socially
sustained systems of meaning the worker's responsibility to his client
will always include whatever alterations in society may be required for
the creation of these systems of meaning. Radical social change is im
plicit in Tillich's concept of the self-actualization of the person.
4. Tillich's philosophy of value also has something to say about
the social worker's total awareness as a person. The easy assumption
that we often fail to establish rapport with our clients because of a
difference in class orientations may be only a rationalization at best.
The barrier which separates us may be a difference in total human aware
ness. In his estrangement from us the client may be saying, "I know the
meaning of existential despair, but do you? How can you, with your neat
and pat answers, empathize with me on a level of awareness of which you
know nothing?" If existential despair is the fundamental problem for
an increasing number of social work clients, can we relate to these
clients creatively on any basis which does not assume an equally signifi
cant experience of life in the worker also? Heidegger reminds us that
it is only as we pass through the poignant experience of our own exis
tential self-discovery, and feel the full impact of our own personal
existence, that we pass from inauthentic selfhood into authentic self
hood. Whether the client, whose basic problem is despair, can find the
courage to affirm himself in the face of despair, will depend upon how
much authenticity he senses in us. Otherwise the client senses that we
are expecting something from him which we have not required of ourselves.
lEdwin A. Burtt, In Search of Philosophic Understanding (New York
and Toronto: Mentor Book Co., 1964), pp. 89-92.
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